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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final ruling of the Third District Court, transferred to
the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this appeal under Section 78A-4-103, Utah Code Ann., which in
pertinent part provides for Court of Appeals jurisdiction over the following:
(2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction
of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)

the final orders and decrees . . . from the district court

(j)

cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did the trial court incorrectly interpret and incorrectly apply the law in ruling
Jerry Warnick was not the prevailing party and therefore not entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under § 78B-5-826, Utah Code Ann., Record at 1572, when he
prevailed on the issue which underlies every single cause of action in the complaint
and counterclaim, namely, whether he should be required to pay attorneys' fees
Anderson & Karrenberg sought from him?
Preserved in the record in Warnick's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees,
Record at 1462; Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees,
Record at 1460; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of Attorney's
Fees, Record at 1474; Memorandum in Support of Jerry Warnick's Motion for
Attorney's Fees, Record at 1515, and supporting documents.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The outcome of this appeal will initially turn on selection of the appropriate
standard of review. Section 78B-5-826, Utah Code Ann., provides that "[a] court
may award ... attorney fees," so superficially, an abuse of discretion standard may
appear appropriate. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008) (emphasis added); see,
also, Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, If 17, 160 P.3d 1041 (§ 78B-5-826 allows
courts to exercise discretion in awarding fees).
However, the trial court's ruling that Warnick was not the prevailing party and
thus not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, Record at 1572, was not based on
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exercise of discretion.

It was based on incorrect interpretation and

misapplication of Section 78B-5-826. Record at 1579-80. "Trial courts do not have
discretion to misapply the law." State v. Barrett, 127 P.3d 682,687 (Utah 2005). A
trial court has no discretion to misapply the law because "interpretation of a statute
is a question of law... review[ed] for correctness without any deference to the legal
conclusions of the district court." Jaques v. Midway Auto Plaza, Inc., 240 P.3d 769,
774 (Utah 2010).
The issue presented for review is thus whether the trial court misinterpreted
and misapplied Section 78B-5-826 when it ruled neither party prevailed, by merely
counting or miscounting the number of claims and counterclaims of each party in the
court's "chart" without looking at the gravamen or underlying grievances of the
parties' claims, which was whether Warnick owed Anderson & Karrenberg fees. The
jury determined that was not the case. Hence Warnick prevailed.

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATUTES & RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. Attorney fees - Reciprocal rights to recover
attorney fees. A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to
recover attorney fees.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was a dispute over whether Jerry Warnick should be required to pay
Anderson & Karrenberg fees it claimed Warnick owed.

After trial, the jury

determined Warnick owed nothing. Record at 1399-1400. Warnick prevailed on the
sole, underlying issue.
However, after the jury's decision, when Warnick sought an award of
attorney's fees under Section 78B-5-826, Utah Code Ann., incredibly, the trial court
refused ID IWHII! W.imiik lens mi II ic basis Ih;i1 neilht'i piiilv |Hf:,vriilnl

Rec mil ;tt

1580.
Both parties applied various legal theories to the underlying question of
whether Warnick owed Anderst

Karrenberg money for legal servient

lere

were two causes of action in Anderson & Karrenberg's complaint. Record at 3-4.
The first alleged Warnick breached his contract to pay Anderson & Karrenberg for
legal services and sought a judgment of $50,810.01 plus interest against Warnick.
Record at 3. I lit- second i MI isf i (faction alleged Warnick was unjustly enriched by
failing to pay Anderson & Karrenberg $50,810.01 plus interest for legal services.
Record at 4.
In hi 'iir.vwi'i MHI UHIII1<JICI;HIII ' hum I rl minnl lie in I mil i we / ndciMiii &
Karrenberg fees and the claim he did was outrageous and made in bad faith since
Anderson & Karrenberg had reneged on its promise to keep legal fees in the
$;.'() lll'Hl icingc h,

WSIIIIK|I

vci V>mil)UII(l lsJ(>i mrj ,il I ' l'i
-9-
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Thus, although styled in various legal theories, the sole underlying issue in the
complaint and counterclaim was whether Warnick owed Anderson & Karrenberg
$50,810.01 plus interest. Record at 12-17. The jury said no, deciding Anderson &
Karrenberg breached its contract with Warnick, who owed Anderson & Karrenberg
nothing. Record at 1399-1400. Warnick requested attorneys' fees under Section
78B-5-826, Utah Code Ann., Record at 1460, 62, 74 and 1515, but incredibly, the
trial court ruled there was no prevailing party, so Warnick was not entitled to an
awarded under Section 78B-5-826. Record at 1580. Warnick appealed. Record at
1582.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 29, 2005, Anderson & Karrenberg entered into an

"Engagement Agreement" with Warnick which in part provides:
In the event that sums payable under this agreement
become the subject of litigation, your signature constitutes
your agreement to pay all collection costs, including
attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this letter
agreement.
Record at 1526-27.
2.

Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties culminating in this

litigation in which Anderson & Karrenberg sued Warnick for unpaid attorney's fees,
while Warnick counterclaimed, claiming he did not owe Anderson & Karrenberg fees
and its claims seeking fees were in bad faith. Record at 1,11.
3.

Initially, both Anderson & Karrenberg and Warnick appeared pro se.

Record at 1, 11.
4.

On August 23,2009, this court dismissed Warnick's counterclaims citing

lack of damages. The trial court reasoned that Warnick's counterclaim was no
different than his 5th, 6th and 7th affirmative defenses. Record at 567-68.
5.

If Warnick's affirmative defenses prevailed, he would have no damages

since he would owe nothing.

If Warnick lost he would by necessity not have

prevailed on his counterclaim. Thus Warnick's counterclaim was superfluous and
should be dismissed, there being no damages outside the principal case. Record
at 12-14 and 554.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

More than five months after his counterclaims were dismissed, Warnick

retained Brian Steffensen of Steffensen Law Firm ("Steffensen") who filed his
appearance on November 13, 2009. Record at 641
7.

None of Steffensen's work for which attorneys' fees are sought pertain

to the dismissed counterclaim.
8.

The case went to trial before a jury which found a contract existed

between the parties, Anderson & Karrenberg had breached it, Warnick had not, and
thus Warnick owed nothing. Record at 1399-1400.
9.

Warnick filed a motion for attorneys' fees under Section 78B-5-826.

Record at 1460, 62, 74 and 1515.
10.

The trial court's minute entry of November 24, 2010 said "the parties

have inadequately briefed" the attorneys' fees issue and ordering Warnick to "submit
a brief fully addressing" his theory including a "table" outlining "required provisions
and the related application/outcome[.]" Record at 1511.
11.

Warnick's counsel submitted a brief "fully addressing" his theory

including a "table" outlining the required provisions and the related application and
outcome showing he should prevail under existing Utah case law. Record at 1515
and 1564.
12.

Nevertheless, the trial court ruled against Warnick stating there was no

prevailing party. Record at 1580. Warnick appealed. Record at 1582.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the applicable statute when it
ruled there was no prevailing party because Warnick prevailed on the gravamen of
the case; he prevailed on the single and only underlying issue, whether he owed
Anderson & Karrenberg fees.
The trial court misinterpreted the applicable statute when it ruled neither party
prevailed considering the (1) contractual language, (2) number of claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., (3) the importance of the claims relative to each
other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and
(4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various
claims. Even using the trial court's approach, it should have ruled Warnick prevailed
because:
(a)

Warnick prevailed on the contractual language in that the jury

determined Anderson & Karrenberg breached the contract, Warnick did not and
Warnick owned Anderson & Karrenberg nothing.
(b)

The underlying issue on the two causes of action in the complaint

and in Warnick's bad faith claim and counterclaim were whether Warnick owed
Anderson & Karrenberg fees for legal services. The jury determined he did not.
(c)

The important, overarching claims in the lawsuit considered as

a whole centered around whether Warnick owed Anderson & Karrenberg fees for
legal services. The jury determined he did not.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(d)

The dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with

the various claims centered around whether Warnick owed Anderson & Karrenberg
$50,810.01 plus interest for legal services. The jury determined he did not.
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ARGUMENT
The trial court determined that neither party prevailed despite the jury's
decision Anderson & Karrenberg breached the attorney - client agreement, Warnick
did not, and Warnick owed Anderson & Karrenberg nothing.

This is a

misinterpretation and misapplication of Section 78B-5-826. Warnick prevailed
because Anderson & Karrenberg was not successful on any of its causes of action
and it obtained non of the relief it sought. Stated another way, Warnick prevailed
because he was successful in defending against every single one of Anderson &
Karrenberg's claims.
I.

SECTION 78B-5-826 APPLIES TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
"[AJttorney fees are awarded only when authorized by contract or by statute."

Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1044 (Utah 2007) (citation omitted).

In

Bilanzich, the plaintiff "ha[d] no contractual right to attorney fees because the fees
provision . . . was unilateral, providing for an award of attorney fees and costs only
to the [defendant] in the event of a lawsuit." Bilanzich at 1344-45. The same is true
in the instant case.
The attorneys' fee provision in the December 29, 2005 "Engagement
Agreement" only provides for an award of attorney's fees to Anderson & Karrenberg
from Warnick. Anderson & Karrenberg is not entitled to attorneys' fees because it
did not prevail on its breach of contract claim and because "a law firm does not
'incur' fees when it uses its own attorneys in a collection action." Jones, Waldo,
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Holbrook, etc. v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1375 (Utah 1996). Hence, neither party
could have been awarded attorneys' fees under terms of the "Engagement Letter"
and Section 78B-5-826 applies.
II.

WARNICK DOES NOT SEEK ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR HIS
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE HE WAS ONLY REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL AFTER THE COUNTERCLAIM WAS DISMISSED.
Warnick does not seek attorney's fees incurred in connection with his

counterclaims, which were dismissed before he retained counsel in this action. Thus
he is not seeking attorney's fees on his claims which were dismissed. Warnick's
claims, If more artfully pled, would have been an affirmative defense rather than a
counterclaim since the gravamen of each was that he did not owe Anderson &
Karrenberg fees because Anderson & Karrenberg breached its promises to him,
which the jury determined was true. Viewed as an affirmative defense, Warnick
prevailed on the gist of his counterclaim.
III.

WARNICK MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 78B-5-826.
The sole basis for an award of attorneys' fees is under Section 78B-5-826,

which provides as follows:
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party
that prevails in a civil action based upon . . . written
contract . . . when the provisions of the . . . written
contract. . . allow at least one party to recover attorney
fees. (Emphasis added).
Warnick fits squarely under its provisions: This case is a civil action, on a written
contract, which has a provision that allows only one party, Anderson & Karrenberg,
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to recover attorneys' fees:
In the even that sums payable under this agreement
become the subject of litigation, your [Warnick's] signature
constitutes your [Warnick's] agreement to pay all collection
costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in the
enforcement of this letter agreement.
Record at 1526-27.
Section 78B-5-826 "requires only that a party to the litigation assert the writing's
enforceability as basis for recovery" not that "the writing actually be enforceable." Bilanzich
at 1045. This Warnick did in his post-trial Jerry Warnick's Motion for Award of Attorney's
Fees and Costs.
IV.

WARNICK MEETS THE EQUITABLE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF 78B-5-826.
The purpose and intent of Section 78B-5-826 is to "level[ ] the playing field by

allowing both parties to recover fees where only one party may assert such a right under
contract, remedying the unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many
contracts[.]" Bilanzich at 1046 (emphasis added). Anderson & Karrenberg is a law firm in
Salt Lake City with legal and financial resources far greater than Warnick. Application of
Section 78B-5-826 would remedy the unequal allocation of litigation risks built into the
attorney - client contract by Anderson & Karrenberg, thus leveling the playing field between
the parties. The intent and purpose of Section 78B-5-826 is met.
V.

WARNICK PREVAILED BECAUSE ANDERSON & KARRENBERG WAS NOT
SUCCESSFUL ON ANY OF ITS CAUSES OF ACTION - IT OBTAINED NONE OF
THE RELIEF IT SOUGHT, WHILE WARNICK SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE
JURY HE OWED ANDERSON & KARRENBERG NOTHING.
With its chart, the trial court simply and superficially added up Anderson &
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Karrenberg's two causes of action and said Warnick prevailed on them, and then
added up Warnick's bad faith claim and counterclaim and said Anderson &
Karrenberg prevailed on them, resulting in a two to two tie. No party prevailed.
Record at 1579.
The fallacy of this superficial misapplication of Section 78B-5-826 becomes
clear when analyzed from this perspective:

If Anderson & Karrenberg had been

more creative and included two more causes of action styled quantum meruit and
quasi-contract, as often happens is such cases, the trial court's superficial approach
would have determined with its "chart" Warnick prevailed against Anderson &
Karrenberg four causes of action. The trial court kept score by counting the
captions in the pleadings. Record at 1579. Warnick's pro se, inartfully pleaded
counterclaim mentions not just fraud, but also reneging on promises (breach of
contract) and representations (misrepresentation), unjust enrichment and extortion.
Record at 15-16. If the trial court had placed these five misguided legal theories in
its "chart" Anderson & Karrenberg would have been the prevailing party even though
it was awarded absolutely nothing it sought and Warnick obtained most of what he
sought.
The gravamen of Warnick's bad faith claim and counterclaim each assert he
owes Anderson & Karrenberg nothing. The gravamen of Anderson & Karrenberg's
two causes of action were that Warnick owed it money. Warnick prevailed on all of
those issues. The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied Section 78B-5-826 to
-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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come to its conclusion no one prevailed.
"The trial court can award . . . attorney fees only for those issues on which [a
party] was the prevailing party." Prince v. Bear River Mutual, 56 P.3d 524,540 (Utah
2002) (rehearing denied). Indeed:
a party seeking fees must allocate its fee request
according to its underlying claims. Indeed, the party
must categorize the time and fees expended for (1)
successful claims for which there may be an
entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims
for which there would have been an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3)
claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.
(Emphasis added; citations omitted).
Prince at 540. Thus, as required by Prince Warnick's fee request is allocated as
follows:
Allocation of Attorneys' Fees Requested by Warnick
Category

Claim

Claims on which Warnick was
successful and may be entitled to
J attorneys' fees:
Claims on which Warnick was
unsuccessful but may have been entitled
to fees:
Claims on which Warnick would not have
been entitled to attorneys' fees:

Fees Requested
by Warnick? |

Claims in A&K's
Complaint

Yes

None

No

Warnick's
Counterclaims
(all tort claims award of
attorneys' fees
impossible)
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No

All attorneys' fees requested by Warnick are in connection with the claim on
which he was successful, defending against A&K's claims in its complaint. He was
pro se and had retained no attorney prior to dismissal of his counterclaims.
The key point, the very most critical common sense concept in connection with
Warnick's request for attorneys' fees is that A&K obtained nothing it sought. A&K
sought attorneys' fees.

It was awarded none. Warnick claimed he owed A&K

nothing. Warnick prevailed on what he wanted. He owed A&K nothing.
RELIEF SOUGHT
1.

Reversal of the trial court's ruling that Warnick was not the prevailing party

and thus not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Section 78B-5-826,
misinterpreting and misapplying that statute.
2.

Remand with directions to award Warnick reasonable attorney's fees

under Section 78B-5-826.
D A T E D this

If

day of December, 2011.

Brian W. Stefrensm /
j )
STEPFENSEN k* LUVWWJQFFICE
Attorneys-for^lerirWamick
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on this the

' (

day of December, 2011,1 mailed, postage

prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to the
following:
John A. Bluth
Samantha J . Slark
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Chase Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2035
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ADDENDUM
Final order:

Trial Court's May 23, 2011 RULING
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^
HIED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Deputy Cferk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
!

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG, a Utah
corporation,

i

RULING
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 080901745

JERRY WARNICK, MARTIN TANNER,
DAVID THAYNE, and HERITAGE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Utah
v
corporation,

Judge: L.A. D EVER

Defendants.
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendant Jerry Wamick's
i

("Defendant") Notice to Submit his Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed March
22,12011. Having reviewed Defendant's Motion and Plaintiffs Opposition thereto, and
being duly advised in the premises of each, the Court makes the following Ruling.
Background

,

Plaintiffs' Complaint, filed January 29, 2008, asserts the following claims: (1)
Breach of Contract and (2) Unjust Enrichment. Plaintiffs claims stem from the alleged
breach of an agreement for legal services. See (PL's Mem. In Suppj For Summ. J. On
All Countercl. Ex. A,1).
The relevant portion of the Engagement Agreement provides:
By confirming this letter agreement where provided bellow, you
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^ K

agree to its terms and guarantee the payment of the amounts! we incur for
fees and costs in this matter. In the event that sums payable [under this
agreement become subject of litigation, your signature constitutes your
agreement to pay all collection costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in
the enforcement of this letter agreement.

Id.
Defendant's counterclaim maintained in relevant part, that "Plaintiff fraudulently
!

induced Defendant to allow Plaintiff enter an appearance on his behalf in the underlying
i

suit by promising that it would not incur legal fees beyond the retainers paid in advance.
. . [and] that total legal fees would be kept in the $20,000 range[.]" |d- at Ex. C, p. 5.
Additionally, although not cited as an individual counterclaim, Defendant raises a claim
of Plaintiffs bad faith. Id.
Discussion o f Case Law, etc..
Attorneys'Fees
1

Generally

Attorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter ofrighturjider a contract or
statute. Foote v. Clarke. 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998)(citations omitted). Those fees
provided for by contract are allowed ''only in strict accordance" with the terms of the
contract, id- (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, an award of attorney
fees must be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact. id. at 55
(quoting Cottonwood Mall v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992)).
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Z**1

/

^

At issue in this case, as related to fees pursuant to the terms of a contract, Utah
Code Annotated Section 78B-5-826 provides:
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract,
or other writing executed after April 28,1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party
to recover attorney fees.
(2011)(emphasis added).
2

Reasonableness Evaluation
j

Although Section 78B-5-826 "does not specifically require that the award of
attorney fees and costs be reasonable, the district court may exercise its discretion to
impose such a requirement." Bilanzich v. Lonetti. 2007 UT 26,1121,160 P.3d 1041
(citing R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 2002 UT 11, J20,40 P.3d 1119). This exercise of
discretion must be based on an evaluation of the evidence. Foote. 962 P.2d at 57
(citation omitted). That is, a court should consider the "relationship of the fee to the
amount recovered, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result
achieved and the necessity of initiating [the] lawsuit to vindicate [the plaintiff s] rights."
]d- (quoting Travner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984)).
When determining what is a reasonable award of attorney fees, the district court
i

must calculate the "lodestar," which is the reasonable number of hoijirs spent on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. United Phosphorus. Ltd. v. Midland
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Fumioant. Inc.. 205 F.3d 1219,1233 (10th Cir. Kan. 2000) (citation omitted). The
district court "must" reduce the actual number of hours expended to a reasonable
i

number to ensure services an attorney would not properly bill to his Client are not billed
to the adverse party. jd-

j

•

When determining the appropriate rate to apply to the reasonable hours, "the
district court should base its hourly rate award on what the evidence shows the market
commands for... analogous litigation." id. (citation omitted). The party requesting the
i

fees bears "the burden of showing that the requested rates are in line with those
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience, and reputation." id. (citation omitted).

[
i

3

Burden on Party Seeking Award

The parly requesting attorney fees bears the burden of proving the amount of
i

hours spent on the case and the appropriate hourly rates. United Phosphorous. 205
F.3d at 1233. In order to prove the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation,
the party must submit "meticulous, contemporaneoustimerecords that reveal, for each
lawyer for whom fees are sought, all hours for which compensation (s requested and
how those hours were allotted to specific tasks." jd. (citation omitted).
I

The district court

can reduce the number of hours when the time records provided to the court are
inadequate, id. at 1234.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f^'

"*%

In order to recover any attorney fees at all, the prevailing party must apportion or
separate out the recoverable feesfromthe nonrecoverable ones. Eaaett v. Wasatch
Energy Corp.. 94 P.3d 193,203 (Utah 2004). The requesting party "must" categorize
the time and fees expended for "(1) successful claims for which therfe may be an
entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and;(3) claims for which
there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Foote. 962 P.2d at 55 (citation omitted).
4

Prevailing Party Theory

The Utah Supreme Court explained, "Which party is the prevailing party is an
appropriate question fox the trial court. This question depends, to a large measure, on
i

the context of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to leave this determination to
the sound discretion of the trial court." R.T. Nielson Co1.2002 UT at ^25, (emphasis
added); see ateo Mt. States Broad. Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App.
j

1989)nypically, determining the 'prevailing party1 for purposes of awarding fees and
i
costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if plaintiff is awarded
a judgment plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant successfully defends and avoids an
.

i
1

The Court notes that Plaintiff, in its Opposition to Defendant's Motion, relies on Neff v. Neff. 2011
UT 6,247 P.3d 380, for the proposition that the prevailing party'theory is outdated. See (PL's Opp. to
Def.'s Mot for Award Atfy's Fees and Costs, 3-4). However, Plaintiffs reliance is misplaced. The trial
court in Neff relied on the "flexible and reasoned approach,* because the opposition parties each obtained
mixed results. Neff, 2011 U T at 1f59. The Neff court does not dismiss the use of the "prevailing party*
theory.

5

!
i
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adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed.")
Appropriate considerations in determining the "prevailing party" include, (1)
contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.,
brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and their
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and] (4) the dollar
amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims." R.T. Nielson
Co.. 2002 UT at 1J25; compare Travnerv. Cushina. 688 P.2d 856, 8J58 (Utah 1984)
(noting that both parties to a contractual claim may be entitled to attorney fees as the
prevailing party where the contractual provision awarding attorney fees does not
mention "prevailing party" and each party is successful on one or more claims) and Mt.
States Broad. Co. 783 P.2d at 556, n.7(["[T]he determination of a 'prevailing party'
becomes even more complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties... and
where the ultimate award of money damages does not adequately represent the actual
success of the parties under the peculiar posture of the case. These cases
demonstrate the need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular
cases who actually is the prevailing party.");" Szoboszlav v. Glessner.664 P.2d 1327,
1334 (Kan. 1983) (citation omitted) (B[C]ases involving counterclaims have held that a
i
party is 'successful' if he obtains a judgment for an amount in excess of the setoff or
counterclaim allowed.")

6
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Flexible and Reasoned Approach - Alternate Theory to Prevailing Party

Under the flexible and reasoned approach, instead of relying solely on the "rigid"
i

i
i

net judgment rule to determine the prevailing party, the court may consider the net
judgment and may also take into account "the amounts actually sought and then
balanc[e that] proportionally with what was recovered." Bonneville D strib. Co, v. Green
River Dev. Assocs.. 2007 UT App 175,1J45,164 P.3d 433 (citation dmitted). Initially, the
flexible and reasoned approach applied in cases where contracts or statutes called for
attorney fees to be awarded to the "prevailing party.ttjd. (citation omitted). However,
the Utah Supreme Court explained that there is essentially no distinction between a
"successful party* and a "prevailing party," and therefore, determined that the flexible
and reasoned approach applied to statutes or contracts awarding attorney fees to the
prevailing party or to the successful party, id. (citation omitted). Thd flexible and
reasoned approach is based, in part, on the principle that trial courts have broad
discretion in awarding attorney fees, and accordingly, should use common sense when
deciding whether to award them. |d. at Tf46 (citation omitted) (determining that both
parties defaulted and, therefore, neither was entitled to attorney fees).
6

Net Judgment Theory - Alternate Theory to Prevailing Party

Generally, there can be only onefinaljudgment in an action and although a
cross-complaint has been filed and matters therein stated are put to! issue, "it is not

7
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such a pleading that requires, or permits the rendition of two separate judgments."
Szoboszlav. 664 P.2d at 1334 (citation omitted). In such a case, it hjas uniformly been
held that the party awarded the net judgment is the prevailing litigant and therefore, the
successful party. |d. (citation omitted): see also Ocean W. Contractors v. Halec Constr.
Co.. 600 P.2d 1102,1105 (Ariz. 1979) ("We hold that since the appellants* recovery of
$ 791.75 exceeded that of appellees' compulsory counterclaim recovery of $ 500, the
'net judgment1 being in appellants' favor for $ 291.75, the trial court erred by not
awarding the 'successful' appellants their costs." (citation omitted)).
Analysis
Based upon the noted case law discussion of attorneys' fees] the following table
("Table") reflects the Court's orders, etc., and the related claims/counterclaims,
judgment.
Ruling, Order, or other judgment

Aug. 24,2009, Order granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

Defendant's Counterclaim of Fraud

Aug. 24,2009, Order granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

Defendant's Claim of Bad Faith

Aug. 4,2010, Special Verdict Form,

J

Claim, Counterclaim, or other Issue

Plaintiff
!
!

Plaintiff

I
Plaintiffs Claim of Breach of Contract

No. 6

Aug. 4,2010, Special Verdict Form,
I
Nos. 5-6

! Party Granted
L Judgment

!

Defendant

i
Plaintiffs Claim of Unjust Enrichment

i

:
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Defendant

I

Conclusions
The Table establishes that neither party is a "prevailing party.1" In considering the
following factors In the entitled matter "(1) contractual language, (2)lthe number of
i
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the parties, (3) jthe importance of
the claims relative to each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit

j
considered as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in
connection with the various claims;" R.T. Nielson Co.. 2002 UT at $25, the Court finds
that neither party is entitled to an award of fees. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion is
DENIED.
i
The following Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No fujrther order is
required.

Dated this 21st day of May, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

j

L.A. DEVER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING dated
!

this

oCD day of May, 2011, postage prepaid, to the following:

Jennifer R. Eshelman
Samantha J. Slark
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Larry G. Reed
Brian Steffensen
STEFFENSEN LAW OFFICE
448 East 400 South, No. 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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